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Nonimmigrants, Equal Protection, and the 
Supremacy Clause 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At the intersection of immigration and equal protection lies a 
judicial vortex. This area of law is a twilight zone of sorts, where 
established constitutional principles do not follow their regular 
paths.1 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
applies to all who fall within the jurisdiction of a state, including 
noncitizens.2 Generally, the same equal protection restrictions placed 
on state laws through the Fourteenth Amendment also restrict 
federal law through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.3 But the Constitution gives Congress exclusive power 
over immigration, which the Supreme Court has interpreted as a 
plenary power that is not subject to traditional judicial review.4 Thus, 
discriminatory laws that would incur rigorous judicial review if 
passed by state legislatures are given, at most, a rational basis review 
if passed by Congress.5 
Furthermore, laws passed by the states, whether discriminatory 
or not, are invalid under the Supremacy Clause if they impose upon 
Congress’s exclusive authority to regulate immigration. If Congress 
expressly grants certain privileges to noncitizens, state laws that 
revoke those privileges will be preempted. The Supremacy Clause, 
therefore, is an unwitting companion to the Equal Protection Clause 
in striking down discriminatory state laws.  
Courts handling cases of state discrimination against noncitizens 
typically review the offending state law under both the Equal 
Protection Clause and the Supremacy Clause. But the courts either 
evaluate the two clauses separately, as alternative holdings, or they 
 
 1. “[I]mmigration is an area in which the normal rules of constitutional law simply do 
not apply.” Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional 
Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 260. 
 2. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). 
 3. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 364–65 n.4 (1974). 
 4. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81–82 (1976).  
 5. “[I]t is not ‘political hypocrisy’ to recognize that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
limits on state powers are substantially different from the constitutional provisions applicable to 
the federal power over immigration and naturalization.” Id. at 86–87. 
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blur the line between the two clauses by using Supremacy Clause 
justifications to invalidate state laws under the Equal Protection 
Clause. More disconcerting, however, is that courts differ on the 
proper equal protection review standard to apply to one particular 
class of noncitizen: nonimmigrants.  
How equal protection applies to discriminatory state laws 
depends on the immigration status of the noncitizen who protests 
the law—some are given more protection than others. There are 
three broad classes of noncitizens in the United States: permanent 
residents, nonimmigrants, and illegal immigrants. Permanent 
residents are most similar to citizens.6 They are entitled to live in the 
United States permanently.7 Nonimmigrants enter the country for a 
variety of reasons and under a variety of conditions, but are generally 
only here temporarily.8 Illegal immigrants, as the title suggests, are 
noncitizens who enter or stay in the United States without 
permission. 
State laws have discriminated against all three of these classes, 
but the standard of equal protection review is not always clear. The 
Supreme Court has held that state laws that discriminate based on 
“alienage” are subject to strict scrutiny review under the Equal 
Protection Clause. But the Court has not defined “alienage” and has 
only applied strict scrutiny when permanent residents challenge 
discriminatory state laws. With one specific exception, the Court has 
stated that laws discriminating against illegal immigrants are only 
subject to a rational basis review.  
Nonimmigrants, however, do not enjoy a well-defined standard 
of review. The Supreme Court has avoided the issue, leaving a legal 
gap that has led to disagreement among lower courts. Some courts 
argue that laws discriminating against nonimmigrants should only be 
given a rational basis review because the Supreme Court has applied 
strict scrutiny only when permanent residents protest discriminatory 
laws. Other courts, however, argue that these discriminatory laws 
should be reviewed using strict scrutiny because “alienage” 
discrimination includes all aliens and general language used by the 
Supreme Court does not limit that interpretation.  
 
 6. “Resident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support the economy, serve in the Armed 
Forces, and contribute in myriad other ways to our society.” In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 
(1973). 
 7. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (2006). 
 8. See id. § 1101(a)(15). 
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This debate, however, frequently ignores the rationale for giving 
any class heightened equal protection scrutiny. Supreme Court cases 
have identified characteristics of discrete classes that justify 
heightened scrutiny, but lower court cases discussing nonimmigrants 
as a class have brushed over these characteristics. Classifying 
nonimmigrants, however, presents a unique problem: they are a 
heterogeneous class. Congress allows nonimmigrants to enter the 
country for a variety of reasons and under a variety of restrictions.9 
Discriminatory state laws may touch upon characteristics shared by 
one subclass of nonimmigrants but not others. This Comment 
proposes a two-step analysis which resolves these issues. 
Because Congress has plenary power over immigration, courts 
should approach discriminatory state laws by first evaluating their 
constitutionality under the Supremacy Clause. If Congress, for 
example, grants rights to nonimmigrants, state laws revoking or 
infringing on those rights are preempted and invalid. There is no 
need for an equal protection analysis in these cases. Furthermore, 
starting an analysis with a Supremacy Clause evaluation eliminates 
problems associated with the heterogeneous nature of the 
nonimmigrant class because federal immigration law accounts for the 
differences between the subclasses. 
If a discriminatory state law is not invalid under the Supremacy 
Clause, a court should then analyze it under the Equal Protection 
Clause with the level of scrutiny based on the class of immigrants at 
issue. Classes traditionally receiving heightened equal protection 
scrutiny share certain characteristics, such as political powerlessness. 
But some of these classes are only given an intermediate level of 
heightened scrutiny, likely because they have mitigating 
circumstances which may lessen the discriminatory impact of state 
laws. Because nonimmigrants share characteristics with classes that 
receive heightened scrutiny but also have mitigating characteristics, 
they should also be given an intermediate level of scrutiny for equal 






 9. See id. 
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Part II of this Comment reviews the constitutionality of state 
laws that discriminate against noncitizens under the Equal Protection 
Clause and the Supremacy Clause and discusses the gap in 
jurisprudence for equal protection of nonimmigrants. Part III 
introduces the two-step analysis proposed by this Comment. Part IV 
applies this proposal to two actual cases and one hypothetical case.  
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DISCRIMINATORY LAWS 
Although this Comment advocates a two-step analysis beginning 
with the Supremacy Clause and then moving on to the Equal 
Protection Clause, the jurisprudence has developed in reverse order. 
Supreme Court cases reviewing state laws that discriminated against 
noncitizens traditionally focused on the Equal Protection Clause.10 
Eventually, however, the Supremacy Clause crept in as an alternate 
rationale for overturning discriminatory state laws.11 As federal 
immigration law has become more detailed, a stronger use of the 
Supremacy Clause has emerged,12 but the need for equal protection 
analysis has not dissipated. Courts continue to face discriminatory 
state laws that are not preempted by federal immigration law. 
A. Striking Down Discriminatory Laws Under                                    
the Equal Protection Clause 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits a state from denying equal protection to “any person 
within its jurisdiction.”13 Three general levels of constitutional review 
are applied to equal protection cases.14 The highest level of review, 
strict scrutiny, applies in two different situations: (1) when the party 
claiming discrimination fits into a suspect class and the 
discrimination is based on that classification or (2) when the 
discrimination denies any individual a fundamental right.15 To pass 
 
 10. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). 
 11. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376–80 (1971). 
 12. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10–17 (1982) (finding that the complicated 
scheme Congress employed for G-4 nonimmigrants preempted a discriminatory state law). 
 13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 14. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (“[W]e apply different levels of 
scrutiny to different types of classifications.”). 
 15. See id. (noting that “[c]lassifications based on race or national origin and 
classifications affecting fundamental rights are given the most exacting scrutiny” (citations 
omitted)). 
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strict scrutiny, a “law must advance a compelling state interest by the 
least restrictive means available.”16 Intermediate scrutiny applies 
when the discrimination is against members of specifically identified 
classes, often referred to as quasi-suspect classes.17 To pass 
intermediate scrutiny, a state law “must be substantially related to an 
important governmental objective.”18 Finally, the lowest level of 
scrutiny, rational basis, applies to cases that do not fit any of these 
classifications.19 A state law is valid under rational basis if it is 
“rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”20 
1. Equal protection for permanent residents 
In Yick Wo v. Hopkins the Supreme Court held that “[t]he 
fourteenth amendment [sic] . . . is not confined to the protection of 
citizens,”21 but also provides protection for noncitizens within the 
jurisdiction of each state. Nearly sixty years later, the Court first 
applied strict scrutiny review when it declared race to be a suspect 
classification.22 The Court subsequently declared alienage to be a 
suspect classification and used strict scrutiny to invalidate state laws 
that “create[d] two classes . . . , indistinguishable except with respect 
to whether they are or are not citizens of this country.”23  
Despite this broad language, the Supreme Court has only used 
strict scrutiny to review state laws that discriminate against 
permanent residents. In Graham v. Richardson, the Court 
 
 16. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984). 
 17. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 437–38 (1985). 
Quasi-suspect classes include non-marital children and women. Clark, 486 U.S. at 461.   
 18. Clark, 486 U.S. at 461; see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“[The 
law] must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to 
achievement of those objectives.”). 
 19. See Clark, 486 U.S. at 461. 
 20. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). 
 21. 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (“[A]n 
alien is surely a ‘person’ in any ordinary sense of that term. Aliens . . . have long been 
recognized as ‘persons’ guaranteed due process [and equal protection] of law by the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.”). 
 22. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“[A]ll legal restrictions 
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say 
that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the 
most rigid scrutiny.”). 
 23. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971). “But the Court’s decisions have 
established that classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are 
inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.” Id. at 371–72 (citations omitted). 
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invalidated the welfare assistance laws of two states. Arizona required 
beneficiaries of an assistance program to either be citizens or to have 
lived in the United States for at least fifteen years.24 Pennsylvania’s 
program denied assistance to all noncitizens regardless of years of 
residence.25 Permanent residents protested both statutes, and the 
Court found that neither passed strict scrutiny.26 Given that the 
permanent residents paid the same taxes, the states’ interest in 
preserving resources for citizens or long-term residents was not 
compelling.27 
Based on alienage classifications, the Supreme Court has used 
strict scrutiny to invalidate laws that required permanent residents to 
submit an application for citizenship to qualify for college financial 
aid,28 that denied permanent residents admission to a state bar,29 and 
that prevented permanent residents from obtaining engineering 
licenses.30 A common thread throughout these cases is that the law at 
issue either specifically singled out permanent residents or the law 
singled out noncitizens generally but was challenged in court only by 
permanent residents. “Thus far, the Supreme Court has reviewed 
with strict scrutiny only state laws affecting permanent resident 
aliens.”31 
Using strict scrutiny for state laws that discriminate against 
permanent residents is logical because permanent residents are part 
of the permanent social fabric of the United States.32 “Given the 
extent to which resident aliens are legally entrenched in American 
 
 24. Id. at 367, 371. 
 25. Id. at 368, 371. 
 26. Id. at 367–68, 374–76. 
 27. “There can be no ‘special public interest’ in tax revenues to which aliens have 
contributed on an equal basis with the residents of the State.” Id. at 376. 
 28. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977). While the statute did not single out resident 
aliens specifically, the wording of the statute exempted refugees paroled in the U.S. and those 
who did not qualify for citizenship but expressed intent to do so once they qualified. Id. at 3–
4. 
 29. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).  
 30. Examining Bd. of Eng’rs, Architects, & Suveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 
(1976). 
 31. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 415 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 32. With certain exceptions, permanent residents are entitled to live and work 
indefinitely in the United States. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) governs the 
rights of permanent residents to maintain their immigration status and stay in the United 
States. For example, INA § 237(a)(2) provides grounds for deportation based on the 
commission of certain crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2006). 
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society, their inability to participate in the political process qualifies 
them as ‘a prime example of a discrete and insular minority for 
whom [] heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.’”33  
But there is an exception to this rule. If a state or local 
government prohibits a permanent resident from holding a position 
which carries a political function, the law will be reviewed under a 
rational basis standard.34 The Supreme Court has “concluded that 
strict scrutiny is out of place when the restriction primarily serves a 
political function.”35 Permanent residents are excludable from these 
positions “because this country entrusts many of its most important 
policy responsibilities to these officers . . . . [I]t represents the 
choice, and right, of the people to be governed by their citizen 
peers.”36 
2. Equal protection for illegal immigrants 
In 1982 the Supreme Court addressed the question of what 
equal protection standard of review to apply to state laws that 
discriminate against illegal immigrants.37 The Court indicated that 
laws discriminating against illegal immigrants will generally receive a 
rational basis review.38  
But the case, Plyler v. Doe, was about a subset of the illegal 
immigrant class, and the Court carved out an exception. It held as 
unconstitutional a Texas statute that denied illegal-immigrant 
 
 33. LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 417 (alteration in original) (quoting Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 
721). Note that the Supreme Court did not limit this argument to permanent residents but 
included all “aliens” in the original sentence. The Fifth Circuit limited the reach of this quote 
to permanent residents. The quoted language, however, comes from a case in which the 
plaintiff was a permanent resident. Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 718. 
 34. See generally Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 
U.S. 634 (1973). “This narrow ‘political-function’ exception to the strict-scrutiny standard is 
based on the ‘State’s historical power to exclude aliens from participation in its democratic 
political institutions.’” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 476–77 (1991) (White, J., 
concurring in part) (quoting Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 648). 
 35. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439 (1982). 
 36. Foley, 435 U.S. at 296. 
 37. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 38. See id. at 219 n.19 (“We reject the claim that ‘illegal aliens’ are a ‘suspect class.’”); 
see also id. at 223 (“Undocumented aliens cannot be treated as a suspect class because their 
presence in this country in violation of federal law is not a ‘constitutional irrelevancy.’”). 
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students admission to public elementary schools.39 The Court 
applied an intermediate-scrutiny-in-disguise review to come to this 
holding. The opinion looked to see if the state regulation was 
“rational,”40 suggesting a rational basis review. But in determining 
whether the state interest was rational, the Court required it to 
further a “substantial goal of the State,”41 suggesting an intermediate 
scrutiny level of review.42 Thus the Court required something more 
than just a mere rational basis. Indeed, concurring and dissenting 
opinions acknowledged that the majority applied some level of 
intermediate scrutiny.43 The Fifth Circuit has labeled the standard 
used by the Plyler Court as a “modified rational basis review.”44 
3. Equal protection for nonimmigrants 
The Supreme Court has not explicitly determined what equal 
protection standard of review to apply to state laws that discriminate 
against nonimmigrants. Lower courts have interpreted this silence 
differently. Some have held that alienage discrimination applies only 
to permanent residents and that state laws discriminating against 
nonimmigrants receive only a rational basis review under the Equal 
Protection Clause. These courts point out that the Supreme Court 
has applied strict scrutiny only to cases where the protesting plaintiff 
is a permanent resident.45  
 
 39. Id. at 230. The offending statute also contained a provision that withheld education 
funds “for the education of children who were not ‘legally admitted’ into the United States” 
from school districts that enrolled illegal immigrants. Id. at 205. 
 40. Id. at 224. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (“To withstand intermediate scrutiny, 
a statutory classification must be substantially related to an important governmental 
objective.”). 
 43. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 239 (Powell, J., concurring) (“In these unique circumstances, 
the Court properly may require that the State’s interests be substantial.” (emphasis added)). In 
dissenting, Chief Justice Burger argued that rational basis is the proper test, not the 
intermediate scrutiny advocated by the majority. “Once it is conceded—as the Court does—
that illegal aliens are not a suspect class, and that education is not a fundamental right, our 
inquiry should focus on and be limited to whether the legislative classification at issue bears a 
rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.” Id. at 248 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) 
(citations omitted). 
 44. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 416 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 45. Id. (“The Court has never applied strict scrutiny review to a state law affecting any 
other alienage classifications, e.g., illegal aliens, the children of illegal aliens, or nonimmigrant 
aliens.”). 
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The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have expressly adopted the rational 
basis review for state laws that single-out nonimmigrants.46 In 
LeClerc v. Webb, for example, the Fifth Circuit used rational basis to 
review the Louisiana State Bar’s rule of only admitting citizens and 
permanent residents.47 The plaintiffs were nonimmigrants who held 
student visas and temporary work visas.48 All were denied bar 
admission based on their immigration status.49 The court explained 
that permanent residents receive higher scrutiny because they “are 
similarly situated to citizens in their economic, social, and civic (as 
opposed to political) conditions.”50 The court examined the 
differences between permanent residents and nonimmigrants and 
“conclude[d] that although aliens are a suspect class in general, they 
are not homogeneous and precedent does not support the 
proposition that nonimmigrant aliens are a suspect class entitled to 
have state legislative classifications concerning them subjected to 
strict scrutiny.”51 
Other courts argue that strict scrutiny is the proper standard of 
review for state laws that discriminate against nonimmigrants. These 
courts focus on the broad meaning of “alienage” and the general 
language used by the Supreme Court when it found alienage 
discrimination to be a suspect classification.52 In Kirk v. New York 
Department of Education, the district court struck down a New York 
 
 46. See id. at 419 (“[T]he Supreme Court has yet expressly to bestow equal protection 
status on nonimmigrant aliens. . . . [A]lthough aliens are a suspect class in general, they are not 
homogeneous and precedent does not support the proposition that nonimmigrant aliens are a 
suspect class entitled to have state legislative classifications concerning them subjected to strict 
scrutiny.”) (footnote omitted); LULAC v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 533 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(“There are abundant good reasons, both legal and pragmatic, why lawful permanent residents 
are the only subclass of aliens who have been treated as a suspect class. This case presents no 
compelling reason why the special protection afforded by suspect-class recognition should be 
extended to lawful temporary resident aliens. Because the instant classification does not result 
in discriminatory harm to members of a suspect class, it is subject only to rational basis 
scrutiny.”). 
 47. 419 F.3d at 410. 
 48. Id. at 410–12. 
 49. Id. at 411. 
 50. Id. at 418 (footnote omitted). 
 51. Id. at 419. The court also rejected using intermediate scrutiny to review the law. Id. 
at 419–20. 
 52. See, e.g., Kirk v. N.Y. Dep’t of Educ., 562 F. Supp. 2d 405, 411 (W.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(“[B]ased on its reading of the aforementioned decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, which 
refer to classifications based on ‘alienage’ generally as being inherently suspect. . . . the Court 
finds that the challenged statute must be reviewed under the strict scrutiny standard.”). 
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state law which denied veterinarian licenses to nonimmigrants.53 The 
district court rejected the Fifth and Sixth Circuit holdings which only 
used the rational basis standard to review state laws that discriminate 
against nonimmigrants.54  
When it declared alienage as a suspect classification, the Supreme 
Court referred to aliens generally—“Aliens as a class are a prime 
example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority for whom such 
heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.”55 Also, when 
summarizing state laws invalidated under a strict scrutiny standard, 
the Supreme Court stated that the offending laws “struck at the 
noncitizens’ ability to exist in the community”—the Court did not 
limit this analysis to permanent residents.56  
Judge Stewart, who dissented on this issue in LeClerc, echoed 
these arguments: “In discussing the alien suspect class, the Supreme 
Court has referred to resident aliens, aliens and non-citizens 
interchangeably.”57 He also noted that “alienage” is defined in 
Black’s Law Dictionary as “the state or condition of being an alien” 
and an alien is defined in the federal immigration law as “any person 
not a citizen or national of the United States.”58 Thus, according to 
Judge Stewart and the district court in Kirk, the Supreme Court 
intended for strict scrutiny to apply to laws that discriminate against 
nonimmigrants and not just permanent residents. Other courts have 
taken the same approach.59 
Lack of a solid, logical standard for reviewing state laws that 
discriminate against nonimmigrants creates two significant problems. 
The first is that nonimmigrants are treated differently depending on 
the jurisdiction in which they live. The Constitution is more 
protective if they live in New York and less protective if they live in 
 
 53. Id. at 407–08, 412–13. 
 54. Id. at 410–11. 
 55. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (citation omitted). 
 56. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295 (1978). 
 57. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 427 (5th Cir. 2005) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 58. Id. at 426 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 79 (8th ed. 1999); 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(3) (2000)). 
 59. See Moreno v. Toll, 489 F. Supp. 658, 664 (D. Md. 1980), aff’d, 645 F.2d 217 
(4th Cir. 1981), aff’d 458 U.S. 1 (1982) (“The court concludes that the Supreme Court cases 
cited have in principle wrapped all resident aliens, both immigrant and nonimmigrant, in the 
suspect classification blanket.”); Tayyari v. N.M. State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1365, 1368, 1372–
73 (D.N.M. 1980) (using strict scrutiny to analyze how a state law affected both permanent 
resident and nonimmigrant plaintiffs). 
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Louisiana. The second problem is that, in light of Plyler, a subset of 
illegal immigrants is given a higher level of protection than 
nonimmigrants living in certain jurisdictions. Not only does this 
offend fundamental equality, it also seems to contravene the 
immigration scheme set up by Congress—some noncitizens without 
permission to enter the country are better protected than other 
noncitizens who do have permission to enter the country. 
 The debate between judges over the application of equal 
protection to nonimmigrants focuses on what the Supreme Court 
means by “alienage” discrimination. While both sides have legitimate 
arguments, neither focuses on the qualities that the Supreme Court 
traditionally looks for when determining whether a class deserves a 
heightened level of scrutiny.60 
B. The Heterogeneity Problem: Difficulty in Finding a                     
Logical Standard 
A key characteristic of classes that benefit from heightened equal 
protection scrutiny is political powerlessness.61 Nonimmigrants are 
politically powerless. But the nonimmigrant class is a heterogeneous 
group, making it difficult to develop a uniform standard of review 
applicable to all subclasses of nonimmigrants. Federal immigration 
law gives specific privileges to some nonimmigrants but not to 
others, and some nonimmigrants enter the country under stricter 
limitations than others. For example, some nonimmigrants stay in 
the United States for short periods of time, while others can be here 
for lengthy periods.62 Some nonimmigrants can only stay in certain 
geographical locations within the United States.63 Some 
nonimmigrants are subject to strict limitations on work 
authorization, while others are free to pursue employment 
opportunities.64 Thus, the nonimmigrant class is heterogeneous 
 
 60. The court in LeClerc did make an attempt to evaluate some of these characteristics, 
but the holding was based on the court’s interpretation of the Supreme Court’s meaning of 
“alienage.” See LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 415–19. 
 61. See discussion infra Part III.B.1. 
 62. Compare “visitors” who stay in the United States for only one year, with some 
possibility for extension, to “Foreign Government Officials” who could potentially stay 
indefinitely. 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2(a)(1), (b)(1) (2010). 
 63. “Transits” are “limited to transit to and from the United Nations Headquarters 
District.” 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(c)(2) (2010). 
 64. For example, nonimmigrants who come to the United States to attend college are 
only allowed limited opportunities to work. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(9) (2010). But children of 
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because its members enter the United States for different reasons, 
under different conditions, and under different obligations. 
The Supreme Court has refused to use heightened equal 
protection scrutiny, (anything more than a rational basis), for 
heterogeneous classes that are “large, diverse, and amorphous.”65 In 
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center the Court found that 
mental handicap is not a quasi-suspect classification and state laws 
that discriminate based on that classification should not be reviewed 
using heightened scrutiny.66 Among the reasons the Court cited for 
refusing to apply heightened scrutiny was that the class of those who 
suffer from mental handicaps is amorphous.  
[T]hey range from those whose disability is not immediately 
evident to those who must be constantly cared for. . . . How this 
large and diversified group is to be treated under the law is a 
difficult and often a technical matter, very much a task for 
legislators guided by qualified professionals and not by the perhaps 
ill-informed opinions of the judiciary.67 
If the Court were to declare one “large and amorphous” class as 
quasi-suspect, it would have a hard time distinguishing other 
amorphous classes, such as “the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, 
and the infirm.”68  
 
foreign officers of certain international organizations are subject to more liberal rules for work 
authorization. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(g)(5) (2010). 
 65. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
 66. 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985). 
 67. Id. at 442–43 (footnote omitted). 
 68. Id. at 446. The Court cited several other reasons for not applying heightened 
scrutiny. State and federal legislatures were actively pursuing laws to protect those with mental 
handicaps, eliminating the need for judicial oversight. Id. at 443–44. Furthermore, the 
existence of positive legislation “negates any claim that the mentally retarded are politically 
powerless in the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention of the lawmakers.” Id. 
at 445. The Court also looked at the fact that “those who are mentally retarded have a reduced 
ability to cope with and function in the everyday world.” Id. at 442. These limitations justified 
laws that single out members of the class. “Such legislation thus singling out the retarded for 
special treatment reflects the real and undeniable differences between the retarded and others.” 
Id. at 444. A heightened standard of review for such laws would hinder legislatures’ ability to 
accommodate these limitations. The Court noted that intermediate scrutiny is used when the 
characteristic at issue “bears ‘no relation to the individual’s ability to participate in and 
contribute to society.’” Id. at 441 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976)). 
However, these reasons do not apply to nonimmigrants. Nonimmigrants lack political power. 
Positive legislation to protect those suffering from mentally retardation likely exists because 
they have family members who are politically powerful and can pass legislation on their behalf. 
Nonimmigrants do not have this same support. Also, state laws that discriminate against 
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Courts that evaluate the issue of equal protection for 
nonimmigrants, therefore, face a dilemma: the class consists of 
individuals in various circumstances, making it difficult to classify 
nonimmigrants into one well-defined group; but the class also suffers 
from the inability to protect itself from discriminatory state laws.  
The Supreme Court likely recognized this dilemma when it 
decided Toll v. Moreno.69 The issue of equal protection for 
nonimmigrants was directly before the Court, but it declined to 
address the equal protection issue and relied instead on the 
Supremacy Clause to find a discriminatory law unconstitutional.70 
With this opinion, the Court demonstrated that the Supremacy 
Clause is often an easier way to analyze state laws that single out 
nonimmigrants. But to understand how the Supremacy Clause 
invalidates discriminatory state laws, a foundational knowledge of 
Congress’s plenary power over immigration is necessary. 
C. Is the Supremacy Clause the Answer? 
Because Congress has plenary power over immigration matters, 
any state law that contravenes congressional use of this power is 
unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause.71 But this plenary 
power also means that Congress can discriminate against noncitizens 
in ways forbidden to the states. The power to regulate everything 
related to immigration with minimal judicial review is derived from 
judicial interpretation of the Constitution.72 Congress has plenary 
authority to create laws governing “the admission and expulsion of 
aliens” and “aliens’ rights and obligations” once they are in the 
United States.73  
 
nonimmigrants do so not based on their abilities but based on their immigration status. Thus, 
such laws bear no relation to nonimmigrants’ ability to contribute to society.   
 69. 458 U.S. 1 (1982). 
 70. Id. at 9–10. See infra notes 93–98 and accompanying text. 
 71. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”). 
 72. “Federal authority to regulate the status of aliens derives from various sources, 
including the Federal Government’s power ‘[t]o establish [a] uniform Rule of Naturalization,’ 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, its power ‘[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,’ id., cl. 
3, and its broad authority over foreign affairs.” Toll, 458 U.S. at 10. For a discussion of the 
plenary power see Legomsky, supra note 1. 
 73. Legomsky, supra note 1, at 256, 306. Legomsky states that the plenary power only 
covers “admission and expulsion” powers but admits that Congress’s authority over “rights 
and obligations” of noncitizens is broad and subject to the least exacting judicial review. Id. at 
256.  
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1. Discrimination by Congress 
The Supreme Court has found that the same protections against 
discriminatory state laws provided by the Equal Protection Clause 
also apply against federal laws through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.74 This principle does not apply, however, to 
federal immigration law because the plenary power authorizes 
Congress to discriminate. Congress would not have the ability to 
exercise its authority over immigration if it were required to treat all 
noncitizens the same way it treats citizens. “Congress regularly 
makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”75 For 
example, Congress can pass laws denying certain classes of 
noncitizens the legal right to work in the United States without 
offending the equal protection aspects of the Due Process Clause.76 
Any challenged federal law that discriminates against noncitizens in 
general or against specific subclasses of noncitizens will be reviewed 
using, at most, a rational basis standard.77  
 
 
 74. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 364 n.4 (1974) (“Although ‘the Fifth 
Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that is “so 
unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.”’ Thus, if a classification would be invalid under 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is also inconsistent with the due 
process requirement of the Fifth Amendment.” (citations omitted)).  
 75. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976). 
 76. Students, for example, are allowed to enter the country and gain an education but 
are only allowed to work under certain circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(9) (2010). 
 77. “In mild contrast with the plenary Congressional power over immigration, the 
Supreme Court has acknowledged that federal statutes in the aliens’ rights area are reviewed 
for rationality when challenged as discriminatory, though admittedly that review has not been 
intensive in practice. In addition, with one rapidly expanding exception, state action classifying 
on the basis of alienage has been subjected to strict scrutiny.” Legomsky, supra note 1, at 256 
(footnotes omitted); see also Midi v. Holder, 566 F.3d 132, 134 (4th Cir. 2009), cert denied, 
130 S. Ct. 805 (2009) (“Although courts usually subject national-origin classifications to strict 
scrutiny, when such classifications involve unadmitted aliens in the immigration context, we 
subject them only to rational basis review. This is so because Congress has plenary power over 
immigration and naturalization, and may ‘permissibly set immigration criteria based on an 
alien’s nationality,’ Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 72 (1st Cir. 2006), even though such 
distinctions would be suspect if applied to American citizens.”) (citations omitted); Avila v. 
Biedess, 78 P.3d 280, 285 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (depublished) (noting that courts follow a 
rational basis standard for discriminatory federal laws because the “Constitution gives Congress 
plenary authority to legislate on immigration and alienage issues”).  
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The dynamic between equal protection and the plenary power 
over immigration is not available to states.78 This principle explains 
the seemingly inconsistent results in two Supreme Court cases 
decided within a five-year period. In Graham v. Richardson,79 the 
Supreme Court used strict scrutiny to invalidate state laws that either 
denied welfare benefits to noncitizens or contained a residency 
requirement to qualify for the benefits. In Mathews v. Diaz, however, 
the Court upheld a federal law requiring noncitizens to be 
permanent residents for five years before becoming eligible for 
certain federal Medicare programs.80 The Supreme Court described 
the difference between the two cases in terms of both Congress’s 
plenary power over immigration and the Equal Protection Clause: 
[The state rules] violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and encroach upon the exclusive federal 
power over the entrance and residence of aliens. Of course, the 
latter ground of decision actually supports our holding today that it 
is the business of the political branches of the Federal Government, 
rather than that of either the States or the Federal Judiciary, to 
regulate the conditions of entry and residence of aliens. The equal 
protection analysis also involves significantly different 
considerations because it concerns the relationship between aliens 
and the States rather than between aliens and the Federal 
Government.81 
2. Discrimination by the states 
In addition to justifying discrimination by Congress, the plenary 
power provides a barrier against discriminatory state laws. State laws 
that deny rights expressly granted by Congress to noncitizens are 
preempted by federal law and are unconstitutional under the 
Supremacy Clause.82 The Supreme Court cases that established strict 
 
 78. “[I]t is not ‘political hypocrisy’ to recognize that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
limits on state powers are substantially different from the constitutional provisions applicable to 
the federal power over immigration and naturalization.” Mathews, 426 U.S. at 86–87. 
 79. 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
 80. 426 U.S. 67 (1976). 
 81. Id. at 84–85 (emphasis added). 
 82. “The Federal Government has broad constitutional powers in determining what 
aliens shall be admitted to the United States, the period they may remain, regulation of their 
conduct before naturalization, and the terms and conditions of their naturalization. Under the 
Constitution the states are granted no such powers; they can neither add to nor take from the 
conditions lawfully imposed by Congress upon admission, naturalization and residence of 
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scrutiny as the review standard for alienage discrimination under the 
Equal Protection Clause also relied on the Supremacy Clause as an 
alternative reason for finding the state laws unconstitutional.83  
The Court has also described equal protection holdings in terms 
of the Supremacy Clause by stating that strict scrutiny applies 
because the state laws are inconsistent with the federal immigration 
scheme: 
Following Graham, a series of decisions has resulted requiring state 
action to meet close scrutiny to exclude aliens as a class . . . . These 
exclusions struck at the noncitizens’ ability to exist in the 
community, a position seemingly inconsistent with the 
congressional determination to admit the alien to permanent 
residence.84 
Explanations like this, however, blur the line between the Equal 
Protection Clause and the Supremacy Clause, and lower courts have 
used Supremacy Clause rationale to decide the equal protection 
issue.85 
Ten years after Graham established the strict scrutiny standard 
for alienage discrimination, the Supreme Court demonstrated that it 
had shifted to a stronger reliance on the Supremacy Clause to 
analyze state laws.86 In Toll v. Moreno, the Court faced the question 
of whether alienage discrimination includes discrimination against 
nonimmigrants. Instead of answering that question, however, the 
 
aliens in the United States or the several states. State laws which impose discriminatory burdens 
upon the entrance or residence of aliens lawfully within the United States conflict with this 
constitutionally derived federal power to regulate immigration, and have accordingly been held 
invalid.” Takashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948). 
 83. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson 403 U.S. 365, 377–80 (1971) (finding state laws 
that denied welfare benefits to noncitizens unconstitutional because they contravened the 
immigration policy established by Congress).  
 84. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295 (1978) (citations omitted). 
 85. See, e.g., Carlson v. Reed, 249 F.3d 876, 882–83 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting 
appellant’s equal protection argument because California’s tuition residency scheme fits with 
federal immigration law). 
 86. A state law that affects noncitizens will violate the Supremacy Clause if it meets one 
of three tests. If the state law amounts to a direct regulation of immigration it will be invalid 
because it infringes onto Congress’s exclusive authority. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354–
55 (1976). Additionally, a state law will be invalid if Congress intended to “occupy the field” 
and completely oust any state power. Id. at 357–63. Finally, a state law will be invalid if it 
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives 
of Congress.” Id. at 363 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
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Court relied completely on the Supremacy Clause to strike down a 
discriminatory state law. 
The case arose when the University of Maryland denied in-state 
tuition to nonimmigrants.87 The nonimmigrants challenging the 
policy were children of officers of international organizations who 
were living in Maryland.88 They had been admitted to the United 
States with their parents, who held G-4 visas (for officers of 
international organizations such as the World Trade Organization).89 
The students filed suit arguing, among other things, that the policy 
violated the Equal Protection Clause and the Supremacy Clause.90 
The district court followed the pattern set by the Supreme Court in 
Graham and decided the case based primarily on the Equal 
Protection Clause with an analysis under the Supremacy Clause as an 
alternative holding.91 The court determined that the Supreme Court 
had “wrapped all resident aliens, both immigrant and nonimmigrant, 
in the suspect classification blanket” and struck down the university 
policy based on a strict scrutiny review.92 The court of appeals 
affirmed the decision with no opinion and passed the entire analysis 
up to the Supreme Court.93 Thus the question of what standard of 
review to apply to state laws discriminating against nonimmigrants 
was directly before the Supreme Court. 
But the Supreme Court expressly declined to reach the equal 
protection question and instead relied completely on the Supremacy 
Clause to affirm the holding.94 The Court found that Congress’s 
complicated immigration scheme for G-4 nonimmigrants precluded 
states from denying in-state tuition to those who had established a 
 
 87. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 3–5 (1982). The procedural history of the case is quite 
complicated. This Supreme Court decision was actually the third time the Court had heard this 
particular case. The University of Maryland first concluded that the nonimmigrant students 
were not entitled to in-state tuition because they were not domiciled in the state. After a 
lengthy battle in the courts, the university revised its policy and determined that even if 
nonimmigrants could establish domicile in the state they were not entitled to in-state tuition. 
The final Supreme Court opinion dealt with the constitutionality of this revised policy. Id. at 
3–9. 
 88. Id. at 4. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Moreno v. Toll, 489 F. Supp. 658 (1980). 
 92. Id. at 664. 
 93. Toll, 458 U.S. at 9. 
 94. Id. at 9–10. 
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domicile within the state.95 The Court pointed out that while 
Congress denied many nonimmigrants the ability to establish 
domicile in the United States, nonimmigrants holding G-4 visas 
were allowed to establish domicile.96 Furthermore, “an array of 
treaties, international agreements, and federal statutes” exempted G-
4 nonimmigrants from various federal and state taxes; this was done 
to induce “organizations to locate significant operations in the 
United States.”97 The university’s tuition policy was invalid because 
it “frustrate[d] these federal policies,” and “[t]he State may not 
recoup indirectly from respondents’ parents the taxes that the 
Federal Government has expressly barred the State from 
collecting.”98  
With this opinion, the Supreme Court demonstrated that courts 
should first look to the Supremacy Clause when evaluating state laws 
that discriminate against noncitizens. It stated that because the 
university policy violated the Supremacy Clause, the Court had “no 
occasion to consider whether the policy violate[d] the Due Process 
or Equal Protection Clauses.”99 Thus state laws targeting noncitizens 
are first evaluated for constitutionality under the Supremacy Clause 
and, if they pass muster, are then evaluated under the Equal 
Protection Clause.  
This is a logical process given Congress’s exclusive and plenary 
power over immigration. Furthermore, the Supremacy Clause 
analysis solves the heterogeneity problem of the nonimmigrant class. 
Each subclass of nonimmigrants is different because federal 
immigration law makes them different. The Supremacy Clause 
analysis would take into account those differences.100 At least one 
commentator has advocated using only the Supremacy Clause to 
evaluate state laws that discriminate against noncitizens: “Arguably, 
 
 95. Id. at 17. 
 96. Id. at 14. 
 97. Id. at 14, 16. 
 98. Id. at 16. 
 99. Id. at 10. 
 100. The Supreme Court in Toll noted that G-4 nonimmigrants were granted the right to 
establish domicile in a state while other nonimmigrants are expressly denied this right. Id. at 
14–15. Thus a state law basing in-state tuition on domicile would be improperly applied under 
the Supremacy Clause if it denied those benefits to G-4 nonimmigrants, but would not be 
improper as applied to other subclasses of nonimmigrants. 
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it would be more consistent with the constitutional structure for the 
Court to deal with these cases under the supremacy clause [sic].”101  
But immigration law has not addressed all issues related to 
noncitizens. The Court acknowledged this in Toll: “[W]hen 
Congress has done nothing more than permit” admission to the 
United States, “the proper application of the principle is likely to be 
a matter of some dispute.”102 Also, not “every state enactment which 
in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus 
per se pre-empted.”103 Indeed, two weeks before deciding Toll, the 
Court decided Plyler, in which it relied on the Equal Protection 
Clause to strike down a state law discriminating against certain illegal 
immigrants.104  
Lower court cases subsequent to Toll have found the need to 
analyze equal protection as it applies to nonimmigrants, and courts 
continue to disagree on the proper standard.105 This highlights the 
need for a clearer equal protection standard for state laws that target 
nonimmigrants.106 
III. DEVELOPING A LOGICAL STANDARD FOR NONIMMIGRANTS 
A two-step approach will solve these issues. The first step is to 
evaluate the state law under the Supremacy Clause. If the law does 
not violate the Supremacy Clause, then courts move to the second 
step and evaluate the law under the Equal Protection Clause using 
intermediate scrutiny.   
A. Supremacy Clause Review 
The Supremacy Clause should be the first step in evaluating 
discriminatory state laws. If federal law preempts a state law, the state 
law is per se unconstitutional and there is no need to analyze the 
equal protection issue. Striking down a state law based on the 
Supremacy Clause is easier than evaluating the equal protection issue 
 
 101. Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Judicial Supervision of Legislative Classifications—A More 
Modest Role for Equal Protection?, 1976 BYU L. REV. 89, 101. 
 102. Toll, 458 U.S. at 13. 
 103. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976). 
 104. See supra text accompanying notes 37–43. 
 105. See supra text accompanying notes 45–59. 
 106. It has been 25 years since the Supreme Court has decided a case dealing with equal 
protection for noncitizens. The last case dealing with this issue was Toll v. Moreno.  
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because a court does not have to subjectively evaluate the state 
interest. Either the state regulation violates the Supremacy Clause or 
it does not. “[S]tate regulation not congressionally sanctioned that 
discriminates against aliens lawfully admitted to the country is 
impermissible if it imposes additional burdens not contemplated by 
Congress.”107  
Furthermore, the initial Supremacy Clause analysis solves the 
equal protection classification issues involved with heterogeneous 
classes. The heterogeneous nature of the nonimmigrant class will not 
prevent the application of heightened equal protection scrutiny 
because the differences between subclasses of nonimmigrants are 
legal in nature. The differences will be accounted for when courts 
evaluate state laws under the Supremacy Clause—before they reach 
the equal protection issue. “[T]he distinctions among [the subclasses 
of nonimmigrants] are relevant for preemption purposes.”108 The 
heterogeneous nature of the nonimmigrant class is different from the 
amorphous nature of classes based on mental handicap, aging, or 
physical disabilities because the limiting characteristics of these 
amorphous classes are physical in nature. Congress made the 
nonimmigrant class heterogeneous through immigration law.109 
Thus the Supreme Court’s reasons for not using heightened scrutiny 
for amorphous classes are not applicable to nonimmigrants.110  
A variation on the facts in Toll illustrates this point. The plaintiffs 
in Toll were all nonimmigrants from the same subclass: dependent 
children of G-4 nonimmigrants.111 If, however, the plaintiffs 
consisted of a mixed class of nonimmigrants, the analysis would be 
different.  
The original policy denied in-state tuition to all non-domiciliaries 
and disallowed all nonimmigrants, including those with G-4 visas, 
 
 107. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 358 n.6. 
 108. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 424 (5th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). 
 109. The Supreme Court stated in Elkins v. Moreno that “[a]lthough nonimmigrant 
aliens can generally be viewed as temporary visitors to the United States, the nonimmigrant 
classification is by no means homogeneous with respect to the terms on which a nonimmigrant 
enters the United States.” 435 U.S. 647, 665 (1978). But this statement was an observation of 
federal immigration law and was not made in the context of equal protection. In the final 
iteration of this case, Toll v. Moreno, the Court expressly ignored the equal protection issue and 
determined the outcome based solely on the Supremacy Clause. 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982). Thus, 
the Court demonstrated that the heterogeneous nature of the nonimmigrant class is resolved 
by looking to the Supremacy Clause. 
 110. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text. 
 111. See Toll, 458 U.S. at 4.  
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from becoming domiciliaries.112 The revised policy acknowledged 
that G-4 visa holders could become domiciled in the state, as 
Congress had provided, but denied in-state tuition to all 
nonimmigrants.113 In both instances, the policy violates the 
Supremacy Clause as it applies to G-4 nonimmigrants.114  
But if the plaintiffs consisted of a mixed class of 
nonimmigrants—some with G-4 visas, some with student F-1 
visas,115 and some with temporary worker H-1B visas116—the 
Supremacy Clause analysis would come out differently. Both F-1 and 
H-1B visa holders are “precluded . . . from establishing domicile in 
the United States” by federal immigration law.117 Thus the original 
policy, denying domicile to nonimmigrants, is consistent with federal 
law in regards to F-1 and H-1B nonimmigrants. The revised policy 
also does not violate the Supremacy Clause with respect to F-1 and 
H-1B nonimmigrants. The Supreme Court found that denying in-
state tuition to domiciled G-4 nonimmigrants contravened federal 
policy because of the tax rules that apply to G-4 nonimmigrants.118 
Those tax rules do not apply to F-1 or H-1B nonimmigrants; 
denying in-state tuition to them will not violate Congressional 
policy. Thus, under this hypothetical, the policy is invalid under the 
Supremacy Clause as applied to G-4 nonimmigrants but not as 
applied to F-1 or H-1B nonimmigrants.  
F-1 and HB-1 visa holders are different subclasses, but with 
respect to in-state tuition, they are similarly situated. Once a state 
law passes Supremacy Clause scrutiny, the heterogeneous nature of 
the nonimmigrant class disappears and a court can apply heightened 
equal protection scrutiny to the discriminatory state law.   
 
 112. See supra note 87. 
 113. See supra note 87. 
 114. See supra text accompanying notes 94–98. 
 115. An F-1 visa holder is “an alien having a residence in a foreign country which he has 
no intention of abandoning, who is a bona fide student qualified to pursue a full course of 
study and who seeks to enter the United States temporarily and solely for the purpose of 
pursuing such a course of study,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(i) (2006). 
 116. An H-1B visa holder is a nonimmigrant who comes to the United States to work 
temporarily in “specialty occupation[s].” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) (2006). But 
nothing prevents H-1B visa holders from attending college part time while they are working. 
 117. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 14 (1982).  
 118. See supra text accompanying notes 97–98. 
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B. Equal Protection Review: Intermediate Scrutiny for 
Nonimmigrants 
For discriminatory state laws that do not violate the Supremacy 
Clause, the Supreme Court should declare intermediate scrutiny to 
be the proper review standard under the Equal Protection Clause. 
Nonimmigrants share characteristics that the Supreme Court looks 
for when applying heightened scrutiny. But, like classes for which the 
Supreme Court uses intermediate scrutiny, they also have mitigating 
characteristics.  
1. Heightened scrutiny for suspect classes 
The famous footnote four in Carolene Products provides the basis 
for heightened equal protection scrutiny. The Supreme Court stated 
that “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a 
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of 
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect 
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching 
judicial inquiry.”119 Since Carolene Products, the Court has used 
“discrete and insular” as a key factor in deciding whether a 
discriminatory state law is subject to strict scrutiny.120 If a law singles 
out discrete and insular minorities, it is suspect. The Supreme Court 
has used strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause to strike 
down state regulations that have discriminated based on nationality, 
race, and alienage.121 
But “discrete and insular” are not the only factors the Court 
looks to when deciding if a classification is suspect. “This [discrete 
and insular] rationale, however, has never been invoked in our 
decisions as a prerequisite to subjecting racial or ethnic distinctions 
to strict scrutiny. Nor has this Court held that discreteness and 
insularity constitute necessary preconditions to a holding that a 
particular classification is invidious.”122 As Carolene Products pointed 
 
 119. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (emphasis 
added).  
 120. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971) (“But the Court's 
decisions have established that classifications based on alienage, like those based on 
nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class 
are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority for whom such heightened judicial 
solicitude is appropriate.” (footnotes and citation omitted)). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978). 
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out, discrete and insular minorities are suspect classes because they 
lack political power to combat discriminatory laws. A suspect class is 
“relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to 
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political 
process.”123 The Supreme Court has also looked to whether the class 
has suffered “a history of purposeful unequal treatment.”124 Of 
course, being discrete and insular, and having a history of 
discrimination can all be viewed as just indicators of a lack of political 
power, either past or present. 
2. Intermediate scrutiny 
The Supreme Court has not been as clear in defining exactly 
what characteristics qualify a class for intermediate scrutiny. Review 
of relevant cases, however, suggests that the classes that enjoy 
intermediate scrutiny, quasi-suspect classes, share some 
characteristics with suspect classes, but also have characteristics that 
mitigate the discrimination or justify a certain level of discrimination. 
The two classifications given intermediate scrutiny are gender and 
non-marital birth.  
The Supreme Court has not explicitly declared gender as a quasi-
suspect classification, but in recent decades, it has consistently used 
intermediate scrutiny to review laws that discriminate based on 
gender.125 Women in particular have suffered a long history of 
discrimination, and “gender classifications . . . are usually based on 
stereotypes.”126 To justify gender discrimination “[s]tate[s] must 
show ‘at least that the [challenged] classification serves “important 
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means 
 
 123. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
 124. Id. at 28; see also Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (“Close relatives are 
not a ‘suspect’ or ‘quasi-suspect’ class. As a historical matter, they have not been subjected to 
discrimination; they do not exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that 
define them as a discrete group; and they are not a minority or politically powerless.”). 
 125. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–34 (1996). In one case a plurality 
opinion argued that strict scrutiny was the proper standard to apply to gender classifications, 
see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682–88 (1973) (plurality opinion), but subsequent 
opinions have not adopted that standard and only use intermediate scrutiny. See Virginia 518 
U.S. at 532–34.  
 126. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 756 (3d 
ed. 2006). 
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employed” are “substantially related to the achievement of those 
objectives.”’”127 
The Court has not explicitly stated why gender classifications are 
reviewed under intermediate scrutiny and not the tougher strict 
scrutiny standard. Justice Scalia stated, “We have no established 
criterion for ‘intermediate scrutiny’ either, but essentially apply it 
when it seems like a good idea to load the dice.”128 The Court has, 
however, acknowledged that inherent differences between men and 
women justify gender classifications in some circumstances.129 For 
example, the physical differences between men and women may be 
seen to justify the military draft for men but not for women. 
Furthermore, some commentators have noted that neither gender 
qualifies as a discrete and insular minority.130 Thus if a lack of 
political power is the driving force behind heightened scrutiny, 
neither gender can claim strict scrutiny.131 But because women have 
suffered through a history of discrimination and political 
powerlessness, there is a need for something more than a rational 
basis review.132  
The Supreme Court also reviews classifications of non-marital 
children with intermediate scrutiny.133 Heightened scrutiny is 
justified because children in this class face a history of 
 
 127. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (third alteration in original) (quoting Miss. Univ. for 
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 
446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980))). 
 128. Id. at 568 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 129. Id. at 533–34. “[T]he Court’s use of intermediate scrutiny for gender classifications 
reflects its view that the biological differences between men and women mean that there are 
more likely to be instances where sex is a justifiable basis for discrimination.” CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 126, at 672–73. 
 130.  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 126, at 756 (“Also, it is claimed that women are a 
political majority who are not isolated from men and thus cannot be considered a discrete and 
insular minority.”). 
 131. “Professor Ely remarked: ‘I may be wrong in supposing that because women now 
are in a position to protect themselves they will, that we are thus unlikely to see in the future 
the sort of official discrimination that has marked our past. But if women don’t protect 
themselves from sex discrimination in the future, it will be because for one reason or another, 
substantive disagreement or more likely the assignment of a low priority to issue, they don’t 
choose to.’” Id. (quoting JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 169 (1980)); see also 
Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1715 
(1984) (“Here, as elsewhere, a partial justification for applying heightened scrutiny is a 
perception that such groups have relatively little political power, increasing the danger that the 
statute in question was the product of an impermissible motivation.”). 
 132. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 126, at 756. 
 133. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
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discrimination.134 Furthermore, their status as non-marital children is 
“determined by causes not within the control of the [child], and it 
bears no relation to the individual’s ability to participate in and 
contribute to society.”135 Despite this, the Court rejected strict 
scrutiny, arguing that a higher standard was not needed to invalidate 
discriminatory laws and that the history of discrimination against the 
class is not as severe as the discrimination against suspect classes.136  
Although the Supreme Court has not identified a specific test for 
classifications that receive intermediate scrutiny, principles distilled 
from the cases provide some answers. Generally, these classes have 
some characteristics indicating a need for heightened scrutiny. But 
they also have mitigating characteristics. For gender classifications, 
women have suffered from a history of unjustified discrimination, 
but the genders have physical differences which justify some 
differentiation in specific laws—provided those laws do not place 
“artificial constraints on an individual’s opportunity.”137 
Furthermore, neither gender can claim to be a minority. Similarly, 
non-marital children suffer from a history of discrimination, but the 
Court felt that was mitigated somewhat because the discrimination 
was not as severe as it was for other classes.  
3. Equal protection for nonimmigrants 
Similarly, nonimmigrants share characteristics indicating a need 
for heightened scrutiny but also have mitigating circumstances. The 
Supreme Court, therefore, should approach the issue of equal 
protection for nonimmigrants the same way it approaches equal 
protection for gender and non-marital children: use intermediate 
scrutiny to review discriminatory laws. 
Nonimmigrants share many of the characteristics that justify 
heightened scrutiny for permanent residents. Like permanent 
residents, nonimmigrants encompass a discrete and insular minority 
that is politically powerless. Nonimmigrants cannot vote, do not run 
for elections, and are “often handicapped by a lack of familiarity with 
 
 134.  For example, non-marital children traditionally have had a tougher burden to meet 
to establish paternity and impose support obligations upon their fathers. See Mathews v. Lucas, 
427 U.S. 495, 505–06 (1976). 
 135. Id. at 505. 
 136. Id. at 506. 
 137. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). 
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our language and customs.”138 Aliens in general, including 
nonimmigrants, have suffered from a history of discrimination.139 
“Aliens as a class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ 
minority . . . for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is 
appropriate.”140 This certainly includes nonimmigrants.  
Many cases do not focus on these characteristics, but instead 
focus on the term “alien.” Some courts argue that alienage 
discrimination means the singling out of all aliens. These courts 
distinguish state laws that discriminate against all noncitizens from 
state laws that just discriminate against specified subclasses of 
noncitizens.141 The Supreme Court accepted this distinction 
regarding discriminatory federal laws because Congress has plenary 
power over immigration.142 If applied to state laws, however, this 
distinction would permit states to discriminate against 
nonimmigrants as long as they do not discriminate against all 
noncitizens.  
The Supreme Court rejected this application. In Nyquist v. 
Mauclet the Court struck down a New York state law that effectively 
banned permanent residents from receiving state financial assistance 
to college unless they applied for citizenship.143 The state argued that 
the discrimination was permissible because it separated some 
noncitizens from other noncitizens and did not separate all 
 
 138. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102 (1976). 
 139. See LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 428–29 (2005) (Stewart, J., dissenting); 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 126, at 767 (“Although America is very much a nation of 
immigrants, discrimination against aliens long has been widespread.”).  
 140. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (citation omitted). 
 141. See, e.g., LULAC v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 530 (6th Cir. 2007) (“This case is not 
about ‘citizens’ versus ‘aliens.’ . . . The statutory classification in this case is between citizens 
and lawful permanent resident aliens on the one hand, and illegal aliens and those aliens who 
are not permanent lawful residents, on the other hand.”) (quoting LULAC v. Bredesen, No. 
3:04-0613, 2004 WL 3048724, at * 3 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 28, 2004)). 
 142. “The real question presented by this case is not whether discrimination between 
citizens and aliens is permissible; rather, it is whether the statutory discrimination within the 
class of aliens allowing benefits to some aliens but not to others is permissible.” Mathews v. 
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976). In Mathews, “the Court was at pains to emphasize that 
Congress, as an aspect of its broad power over immigration and naturalization, enjoys rights to 
distinguish among aliens that are not shared by the States.” Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7 
n.8 (1977). 
 143. 432 U.S. 1, 3–4, 12 (1977). Although the statute did not specifically single out 
permanent residents, it made eligibility for financial aid contingent upon application for 
citizenship but exempted all noncitizens who did not qualify for citizenship. Id. at 3–4. 
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noncitizens from citizens.144 Although the issue was discrimination 
against some permanent residents but not other permanent residents, 
the Court rejected the distinction in broad terms: “The important 
points are that [the state law] is directed at aliens and that only aliens 
are harmed by it. The fact that the statute is not an absolute bar does 
not mean that it does not discriminate against the class.”145 Thus the 
Supreme Court’s general use of the term “alien” does not limit 
application of heightened scrutiny to state laws that only discriminate 
against permanent residents specifically or noncitizens generally. And 
because they share characteristics of “suspectness,” nonimmigrants 
should be given heightened scrutiny for discriminatory state laws. 
But nonimmigrants should not be given strict scrutiny, like 
permanent residents, because the nonimmigrant class has mitigating 
circumstances that either reduce the discriminatory impact of state 
laws or justify some measure of discrimination. In other words, 
nonimmigrants are fundamentally different from permanent 
residents. Unlike permanent residents, they are not permanently 
entrenched in society and do not have a long-term interest in state 
laws.146 The Fifth Circuit pointed out that 
[t]he [Supreme] Court has uniformly focused on two conditions 
particular to [permanent resident] status in justifying strict scrutiny 
review of state laws affecting resident aliens: (1) the inability of 
[permanent residents] to exert political power in their own 
interest . . . ; and (2) the similarity of [permanent residents] and 
citizens.147 
Nonimmigrants meet the first condition but are not similar to 
citizens. Unlike permanent residents, they are temporary members of 
the community. Therefore any discrimination would also be 
temporary. Because strict scrutiny is such a high standard that 
invalidates most discriminatory laws,148 states would be 
 
 144. Id. at 7–8. 
 145. Id. at 9. 
 146. An argument may be made that some nonimmigrants are a near-permanent fixture 
in the United States. Those with G-4 visas, for example, could be here long enough to raise 
their children and send them to American universities. Cf. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982). 
But as the Supreme Court demonstrated in Toll, the Supremacy Clause is the proper vehicle to 
examine the differences between these and other classes of nonimmigrants. Id.  
 147. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 417 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 148. “Only rarely are statutes sustained in the face of strict scrutiny.” Bernal v. Fainter, 
467 U.S. 216, 220 n.6 (1984). 
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overburdened in accommodating temporary residents. State laws 
would be invalid even if there is an important, but not compelling, 
reason for discrimination. Furthermore, nonimmigrants likely have 
no long-term interest in the political process, “may not serve in the 
U.S. military, are subject to strict employment restrictions, incur 
differential tax treatment, and may be denied federal welfare 
benefits.”149 These circumstances would seemingly mitigate 
discrimination in some cases and justify discrimination in other cases. 
Like courts that argue for rational basis, those courts that argue 
for strict scrutiny also focus more on the general definition of “alien” 
than on the characteristics of the nonimmigrant class.150 The debate 
has primarily centered on what the Supreme Court meant when it 
declared discrimination based on alienage as suspect.151 But the 
Supreme Court has demonstrated that strict scrutiny for alienage 
discrimination does not mean strict scrutiny for every class of 
noncitizen. The Court has only applied strict scrutiny when 
permanent residents have challenged the discriminatory state laws, 
and it has avoided the issue when nonimmigrants bring the 
challenge. The Court also held in Plyler that illegal immigrants are 
not entitled to strict scrutiny.152  
If the question was simply whether alienage discrimination 
includes discrimination against nonimmigrants, the Supreme Court 
could have easily provided an answer in Toll v. Moreno. The Court 
did not provide an answer, however, suggesting that the issue is not 
so simple.  
Intermediate scrutiny seems to provide an adequate compromise 
between the competing arguments that pull equal protection for 
nonimmigrants to the extreme ends of the review standard. If the 
Supreme Court were to declare intermediate scrutiny as the proper 
standard, it could strike a balance that addresses the need to protect 
nonimmigrants from unnecessary discrimination and allows the 
states flexibility to accomplish important goals.  
  
 
 149. LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 419. 
 150. See supra text accompanying notes 52–59. 
 151. See supra text accompanying notes 45–59. 
 152. “We reject the claim that ‘illegal aliens’ are a ‘suspect class.’” Plyler v. Doe, 457 
U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982). 
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C. The Intersection of the Supremacy Clause and the                      
Equal Protection Clause 
Courts face four possible scenarios when confronting 
discrimination against nonimmigrants. The first is when federal law 
expressly grants rights to nonimmigrants but states deny these rights. 
This is the situation the Supreme Court faced in Toll. The second 
scenario is the other side of this situation: federal law expressly denies 
a right to nonimmigrants but a state law grants that right.153 In both 
of these scenarios, the state law is preempted by federal immigration 
law and there is no need to examine the state law under equal 
protection. The other two scenarios require an appeal to equal 
protection. The third scenario is when federal law is silent on the 
specific issue and the state adopts a discriminatory law. In such cases, 
state laws are not preempted but are subject to intermediate scrutiny 
under the Equal Protection Clause. The final scenario is when federal 
law authorizes states to deny rights to nonimmigrants.154 This 
scenario presents an additional constitutional question—if Congress 
has plenary authority over immigration and can discriminate against 
noncitizens in ways not allowed to the states, can Congress authorize 
states to discriminate? In other words, does the Supremacy Clause 
preempt the Equal Protection Clause?  
If Congress were allowed to authorize state discrimination, states 
could subvert the Equal Protection Clause by lobbying for 
authorization to discriminate against noncitizens. The phrase “any 
person” from the Equal Protection Clause would be meaningless 
because, in practical effect, equal protection would only apply to 
citizens. Perhaps for these reasons, the Supreme Court has explicitly 
determined that Congress cannot do this.  
Although the Federal Government admittedly has broad 
constitutional power to determine what aliens shall be admitted to 
the United States, the period they may remain, and the terms and 
conditions of their naturalization, Congress does not have the 
 
 153. A hypothetical example would be a state granting domicile status to a nonimmigrant 
when Congress has expressly denied the ability to obtain domicile in the United States. See 
Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 665 (1978) (“Congress expressly conditioned admission for 
some purposes on an intent not to abandon a foreign residence or, by implication, on an intent 
not to seek domicile in the United States.”). Examples of nonimmigrants under this restriction 
include students, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F) (2006); temporary workers, § 1101(a)(15)(H); 
and business or vacation travelers, § 1101(a)(15)(B).  
 154. For an example of such a law see infra text accompanying notes 156–59.  
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power to authorize the individual States to violate the Equal 
Protection Clause.155  
The proper analysis for federal laws that grant discretion to 
states, therefore, is two-fold: (1) the state law does not violate the 
Supremacy Clause because Congress has authorized discrimination; 
but (2) the state law must still face equal protection scrutiny because 
the Supremacy Clause does not legitimize the discrimination. 
The following table reflects the four possible scenarios and the 




Federal Immigration Law State Law Case Outcome 
Congress Grants Rights States Deny 
Rights
Invalid under the 
Supremacy Clause 
Congress Denies Rights States Grant 
Rights
Invalid under the 
Supremacy Clause 




Congress gives Authority 






IV. APPLICATION OF THE TWO-STEP PROCESS 
A. State Laws that Deny “Benefits” 
The Fifth Circuit in LeClerc did not follow the two-step process 
described above, but it did evaluate the offending state law under the 
Supremacy Clause after it had rejected the plaintiff’s equal protection 
claims.156 The court, however, considered only one of the scenarios 
described above: federal regulation that expressly gives rights to 
nonimmigrants and whether or not the state law takes away those 
rights. Some of the plaintiffs in LeClerc were in the United States 
under F-1 student visas and the others were in the United States 
 
 155. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382 (1971) (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 
394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969)). 
 156. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 423–26 (2005). 
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under H-1B temporary worker visas.157 The court concluded that the 
state law in question, which denied bar admission to these 
nonimmigrants, was not a direct contradiction of the regulations 
establishing these visas and was not otherwise preempted by 
immigration law.158 But the court did not consider whether the 
discrimination imposed by the state law was authorized by Congress. 
Although the conclusion is the same, a look at that analysis will 
demonstrate the dynamic between the Supremacy Clause and the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
When Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, it also revised immigration 
law.159 Among other provisions, Congress added 8 U.S.C. §§ 1621 
and 1622. Section 1621 essentially prohibits states from providing 
any “State or local public benefit” to illegal immigrants.160 Section 
1622 authorizes states “to determine the eligibility for any State 
public benefits” of other classes of noncitizens, including 
nonimmigrants.161  
Section 1622 does not define “State public benefits.” But section 
1621, prohibiting state benefits to illegal immigrants, does define 
“State and local public benefit.” Among other things it includes “any 
grant, contract, loan, professional license, or commercial license 
provided by an agency of a State or local government.”162 If that 
same definition applies to “State public benefits” in section 1622, 
then the Act can be interpreted as giving states discretion to deny 
professional licenses, including bar certification, to nonimmigrants.  
Under this interpretation, section 1622 is relevant to the issue in 
LeClerc because it would function as congressional authorization for 
the state discrimination. But Congress cannot authorize states to 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment.163 The Louisiana rule denying 
bar certification to nonimmigrants does not violate the Supremacy 
Clause because Congress has authorized the discrimination. But the 
 
 157. Id. at 410, 412. 
 158. Id. at 423–25. 
 159. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). 
 160. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a) (2006). 
 161. 8 U.S.C. § 1622(a) (2006). The section also provides exceptions for certain aliens, 
including permanent residents.  
 162. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(c) (emphasis added). 
 163. See supra text accompanying note 155. 
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law must still pass intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause to be valid.  
For the law to pass intermediate scrutiny, Louisiana must 
establish that it has an important governmental interest in 
discriminating against nonimmigrants and that the rule is tailored to 
meet that interest.164 The state’s interest was “continuity and 
accountability in legal representation.”165 The need to ensure that 
members of the bar are good stewards of their charge is certainly 
important, but a blanket rule denying bar admission to 
nonimmigrants is not tailored to meet this interest.  
The LeClerc court reasoned that, to meet this interest, the state 
would have to “locate lawyers under its jurisdiction,” and that 
nonimmigrant lawyers who left the country would be difficult to 
locate.166 Also, it would be difficult for the state to discipline 
nonimmigrant attorneys who fled the country after committing 
malpractice.167 Although these concerns are legitimate, the rule 
banning all nonimmigrants from the bar is both underinclusive and 
overinclusive.  
Even when using less than strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court has 
struck down discriminatory laws that were underinclusive, 
overinclusive, or both.168 In Jimemz v. Weinberger, the Court 
invalidated an application of the Social Security Act that denied 
benefits to certain non-marital children of disabled parents.169 The 
policy denied benefits to non-marital children born after a parent’s 
disabled condition began, even if the children could establish that 
they were dependent upon that parent for support.170 The Court 
found that the government interest, “prevention of spurious claims,” 
was valid.171 But the policy was overinclusive because it “benefits 
some children . . . who are not dependent upon their disabled 
parent,” thus allowing spurious claims from other classes of 
 
 164. The law “must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially 
related to achievement of those objectives.” Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
 165. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 421 (2005). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. For a discussion of overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness see Joseph Tussman & 
Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 348–53 (1949). 
 169. 417 U.S. 628 (1974). 
 170. Id. at 630, 635. 
 171. Id. at 636. 
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children.172 The policy was also underinclusive because it 
“conclusively excludes some [non-marital children] who are, in fact, 
dependent upon their disabled parent.”173  
Likewise, Louisiana’s policy of denying bar admissions to 
nonimmigrants is both underinclusive and overinclusive. The LeClerc 
court admitted that Louisiana’s policy is underinclusive and 
suggested that it would not pass heightened scrutiny.174 It is 
underinclusive because unscrupulous attorneys who are citizens or 
permanent residents could also leave the country to avoid discipline. 
And a nonimmigrant is not necessarily harder to locate than one who 
is not a nonimmigrant. The rule is also overinclusive because it 
punishes all nonimmigrants for the possibility that some within the 
class might commit malpractice. Also, it mandates the ultimate 
punishment for this possibility. Instead of denying all nonimmigrants 
admission to the bar, the state could just require that all admitted 
nonimmigrants purchase extra malpractice insurance to cover the 
possibility of flight. Thus, even if the Louisiana rule passes a rational 
basis test, it should not pass intermediate scrutiny. The court should 
have applied intermediate scrutiny and should have found the rule 
unconstitutional.  
B. State Laws that Create Extra Obligations 
In contrast to rules that deny benefits to nonimmigrants, other 
discriminatory state rules might add additional burdens for 
nonimmigrants. In one case the University of Toledo required 
nonimmigrant students to purchase health insurance but made 
health insurance optional for students who were citizens or 
permanent residents.175 Nonimmigrant students who entered the 
United States on F-1 student visas challenged the rule.176 Like the 
LeClerc decision, the district court evaluated the rule under the 
Supremacy Clause after it had done so under the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
 
 172. Id. at 637. 
 173. Id. 
 174. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 420–21 (2005). The court used a few paragraphs 
to argue that the heightened scrutiny used in Plyler was not applicable. This indicated that the 
Louisiana rule would not have passed intermediate scrutiny; otherwise, the court would have 
just stated that the rule would be valid even under an intermediate scrutiny review. 
 175. Ahmed v. Univ. of Toledo, 664 F. Supp. 282, 284–85 (1986). 
 176. Id. at 283–84.  
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 The court found that the rule did not violate the Supremacy 
Clause because it “is a logical and legal extension of the policies of 
Congress.”177 The court was likely correct in this conclusion. The 
health insurance policy is not a direct regulation of immigration—
nothing in federal immigration law suggests that Congress intended 
to “occupy the field” with respect to health insurance policies.178 
Also, the policy does not seem to “stand[] as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”179 To enter the United States on an F-1 visa, a student 
must show “evidence of financial support.”180 “The federal policy 
requires that these students be [financially] responsible: the 
institution which the student will attend must certify that the student 
is entering this country with sufficient financial resources to meet all 
of his or her anticipated expenses.”181 A school policy which reduces 
financial risk by mandating health insurance, therefore, likely furthers 
congressional objectives rather than hindering them.  
The policy passes Supremacy Clause scrutiny, but should have 
incurred intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. 
The court in Ahmed used a rational basis review and found that 
“[t]he rationale for the policy is the protection of foreign students in 
the face of medical needs which, absent insurance, could be a 
potential medical crisis.”182 An additional state interest might be the 
preservation of state resources by minimizing the number of medical 
emergencies paid for by state funds. These justifications may qualify 
as important state interests, but the court did not analyze the issue.  
Furthermore, like the state policy in LeClerc, this school policy 
may have a tailoring problem if it were decided today. This case was 
decided in 1986, but in 2004, Ohio enacted a regulation providing 
emergency medical care funding for noncitizens who do not qualify 
for regular Medicaid benefits.183 This new benefit includes 
nonimmigrant students. If the case were decided today, therefore, 
 
 177. Id. at 287. 
 178. Immigration laws governing nonimmigrant students are silent on the issue of health 
insurance. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(i) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f) (2010).  
 179. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 363 (1976) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 
U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 180. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(1)(B) (2010). 
 181. Ahmed, 664 F. Supp. at 287. 
 182. Id. 
 183. See OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5101:1-41-20 (2010). 
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the rule would be seemingly underinclusive. Nonimmigrants must 
obtain more comprehensive medical coverage, but students who are 
citizens and permanent residents are allowed to merely rely on 
Medicaid funding for medical emergencies—why is the state not 
interested in “protecting” these other students? Also, if the justifying 
interest was to preserve state funds, a more effective law would be to 
require all students to obtain health insurance.184  
These points may be arguable, and some courts may find that the 
policy does pass intermediate scrutiny, but the intermediate scrutiny 
standard would require courts to take a harder look at state policies 
that single out nonimmigrants. 
C. State Laws that Would Likely Pass Intermediate Scrutiny 
In Toll, the Supreme Court invalidated a policy that denied in-
state tuition to a specific subclass of nonimmigrants using the 
Supremacy Clause.185 State laws creating residency requirements that 
generally deny in-state tuition to nonimmigrants, however, would 
likely pass constitutional review.186 “Congress expressly conditioned 
admission for [many nonimmigrants] on an intent not to abandon a 
foreign residence or, by implication, on an intent not to seek 
domicile in the United States.”187 If states base their tuition decisions 
on the domicile of the student, and the domicile rules do not 
contradict federal immigration law, then the rule will not violate the 
Supremacy Clause.188 The law would also pass intermediate scrutiny 
under the Equal Protection Clause because a state has an important 
interest in preserving state resources for use by residents.189 A law 
 
 184. The school health insurance policy has changed somewhat since Ahmed was 
decided. Now all students who are registered for six or more credits are required to purchase 
health insurance. But nonimmigrant students are still required to purchase health insurance no 
matter how many credits for which they register. See UT Student Health Insurance: Overview 
and Rates, UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO, http://www.utoledo.edu/healthservices/student/ 
health_insurance/index.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2011). 
 185.  See supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text. 
 186. Cf. Carlson v. Reed, 249 F.3d 876 (Cal. 2001) (finding the state law did not violate 
the Supremacy Clause and, although not applying intermediate scrutiny, finding that the law 
also did not violate the Equal Protection Clause even though it denied in-state tuition to those 
nonimmigrants who could not establish domicile in the state). 
 187. Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 665 (1978). 
 188. See Carlson, 249 F.3d at 881. 
 189. Plyler may stand in the way of this argument. In that case, the Supreme Court 
seemingly applied intermediate scrutiny. See supra text accompanying notes 37–44. The state 
asserted an interest in the “preservation of the state’s limited resources for the education of its 
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conditioning in-state tuition on residency requirements seems 
properly tailored to meet that interest.190 
V. CONCLUSION 
Equal Protection jurisprudence has failed to establish where 
nonimmigrants fit in the U.S. legal landscape. The Supreme Court 
declared that state laws discriminating based on alienage are subject 
to strict scrutiny, but the Court has only applied this to permanent 
residents. Furthermore, the Court has refused to apply strict scrutiny 
for illegal immigrants. Thus, “alienage” does not necessarily mean all 
noncitizens, and lower courts have struggled to find the proper 
standard to use when reviewing state laws that discriminate against 
nonimmigrants. Some courts argue that “alienage” includes 
nonimmigrants and that strict scrutiny is the proper standard. Other 
courts point out that the Supreme Court has not expressly applied 
strict scrutiny for nonimmigrants even though it had an opportunity 
to do so. Finding an appropriate standard is difficult because 
nonimmigrants are a heterogeneous class—they enter the United 
States for many different reasons and under various requirements 
established by federal immigration law.  
For this reason, courts should approach cases of state 
discrimination by first evaluating the law under the Supremacy 
Clause. If the state law infringes upon Congress’s plenary power over 
immigration it will be per se invalid. But state laws that are not 
invalid under the Supremacy Clause must still be constitutional 
under the Equal Protection Clause. Because the heterogeneous 
nature of the nonimmigrant class is created by immigration law, the 
Supremacy Clause analysis should mitigate the differences between 
each subclass of nonimmigrants. Thus, state laws that do not violate 
the Supremacy Clause will be discriminatory against a homogenous 
 
lawful residents.” Pyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 227 (1982). The Court rejected this, stating 
that “a concern for the preservation of resources standing alone can hardly justify the 
classification used in allocating those resources.” Id. (citation omitted). The Court, however, 
did not reject this as an important government interest, but rather found the state rule, which 
denied primary education to illegal immigrant children, failed the tailoring requirement. Id. at 
227–30. “[E]ven if improvement in the quality of education were a likely result of barring 
some number of children from the schools of the State, the State must support its selection of 
this group as the appropriate target for exclusion.” Id. at 229 .  
 190. Cf. Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D.C. Minn. 1971), aff’d 401 U.S. 985 
(1971). 
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class: foreigners who have entered the country legally and 
temporarily.  
And these nonimmigrants have the characteristics of classes that 
need heightened equal protection scrutiny—in particular, they are 
powerless to politically challenge discriminatory laws. But because 
this is mitigated by the temporary nature of nonimmigrant’s 
residency, states should not be burdened by a strict scrutiny 
standard. Thus, an intermediate standard of review is the proper 
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